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Misplaced Fidelity 
LA WYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW. By W. Bradley Wendel. Princeton, New 
Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2010. 286 pages. $35.00. 
Reviewed by David Luban * 
I. Introduction: Situating Lawyers and Fidelity to Law 
The contemporary subject of theoretical legal ethics began with a 
handful of papers in the 1970s and early 1980s, mostly by moral 
philosophers troubled by the apparent dissonance between impartial morality 
and the one-sided partisanship of the lawyer's role.l The so-called standard 
conception of the lawyer's role, captured in the mantra of zealous advocacy, 
combines three elements: partisanship, neutrality, and nonaccountability.2 
Partisanship requires lawyers to pursue lawful client ends by any lawful 
means necessary, regardless of the morality of the ends or the damage the 
means might inflict on the innocent? Neutrality means that lawyers must not 
exercise moral judgment over their clients' lawful ends or the lawful means 
.. University Professor in Law and Philosophy, Georgetown University Law Center. 
1. E.g., ALAN H. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980); 
THE GOOD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND LAWYERS' ETHICS (David Luban ed., 1983) 
[hereinafter THE GOOD LAWYER]; Charles Fried, The Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of 
the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in 
ProfeSSional Ethics, 55 N.Y.U. L. REv. 63 (1980); William H. Simon, Commentary, The Ideology 
of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 WIS. L. REv. 29; Richard 
Wasserstrom, Lawyers as ProfeSSionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM. RTS. I (1975). Simon's 
article focused less on moral philosophy than on jurisprudence, and in subsequent works it became 
clear that Simon's own questions and answers differ significantly from those of the moral 
philosophers. See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 879-
85 (1999) (describing and analyzing the shift in Simon's position between The Jdeology of 
Advocacy and his 1998 book, The Practice of Justice: A Theory of Lawyers , EthiCS); Simon, supra, 
at 32 (establishing that the article analyzes various jurisprudential doctrines). 
2. The term standard conception originated, I believe, in Postema, supra note I, at 73. More or 
less simultaneously, Simon and Postema identified the three components of the standard conception. 
Jd.; Simon, supra note I, at 36-37. Murray L. Schwartz also identified two of the three 
components-partisanship and nonaccountability. Murray L. Schwartz, The Professionalism and 
Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 669, 671 (1978). In a well-known paper, Ted 
Schneyer denied that there is anything standard about the conception and complained that it 
amounted to moral philosophy's standard misconception of legal ethics. Ted Schneyer, Moral 
Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REv. 1529, 1569. I continue to 
think that the conception is standard. See generally DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN 
ETHICAL STUDY 393-403 (1988) [hereinafter LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE] (responding to 
Schneyer). But to avoid begging questions, I now prefer the more descriptive term neutral 
partisanship in place of standard conception. I will stick with Postema's label here because it is the 
one Wendel uses. 
3. Postema, supra note I, at 73. 
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used to pursue them.4 And lawyers cannot be held morally accountable for 
acting on their clients' behalf.5 The central question raised by the standard 
conception is why lawyers get a free pass from morality in a pastime that is 
far from victimless. As Richard Wasserstrom and Gerald Postema observed, 
the lawyer does her work through speech and persuasion.6 Her moral facul­
ties are fully engaged in a way that seems uniquely hard to square with 
nonaccountability.7 
The general issue animating most of this work is the problem of role 
morality: how can it be that her professional role might require a lawyer to 
do things that would be morally forbidden to a nonlawyer? Charles Fried 
asked, "Can a good lawyer be a good person?"g And Wasserstrom wondered 
whether "the lawyer-client relationship renders the lawyer at best systemati­
cally amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral.,,9 To the 
response that the adversary system requires lawyers to play a partisan role, 
philosophers scrutinized the "adversary system excuse" and found it 
wanting.IO Others defended both the standard conception and the adversary 
system. II The critics were less concrete in identifying alternatives to what 
Wasserstrom called the "simplified moral world" of the standard 
conception. 1 2  Postema reconceived the lawyer's role a s  a "recourse role," 
meaning that it has built into it the recourse of breaking role when morality 
requires it.13 Wasserstrom and Simon called for deprofessionalization 
(although Simon eventually developed a different approach).1 4  My own 
position replaces the standard conception with a stance that I labeled "moral 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
7. Postema, supra note I, at 76; Wasserstrom, supra note I, at 14. 
8. Fried, supra note I, at 1060. 
9. Wasserstrom, supra note I, at 1. 
10. See, e.g., David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 
I, at 83, 83-118 (coining the expression adversary system excuse and explaining why the excuse is 
insufficient); Simon, supra note I, at 130-44 (decrying the adversary system excuse as inadequate); 
see also DAVID LUBAN, The Adversary System Excuse, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY 19, 
19-64 (2007) (revising Luban's 1983 essay). 
11. See, e.g., MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 9, 12 
(1975) (championing the adversary system as protective of individuals' fundamental rights and 
emphasizing the importance of partisanship and neutrality); STEPHAN LANDSMAN, THE 
ADVERSARY SYSTEM: A DESCRIPTION AND DEFENSE (1984) (advocating for the adversary system). 
12. Wasserstrom, supra note I, at 2. 
13. Postema, supra note I, at 81-83 (attributing the recourse-role concept to MORTIMER R. 
KADISH & SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 31-36 (1973». 
14. See Simon, supra note I, at 130-44 (positing that personal ethics and respect for clients 
should guide lawyers' conduct); Wasserstrom, supra note I, at 21-23 (proposing that lawyers 
should strive to do what is best for their clients as humans, not to simply exercise their own legal 
competency most effectively). Simon's later approach calls for contextual analysis and the pursuit 
of legal justice. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY OF LA WYERS' ETHICS 
9 (1998). 
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activism," in which lawyers must act as they would if the adversary system 
excuse was unavailable to them.ls 
Obviously, these writers were not the first to question the lawyer's role 
in a philosophical spirit. Arguably, the critique goes back as far as Plato's 
Gorgias and Theaetetus,16 and in the twentieth century, Lon Fuller raised 
similar questions and provided a sophisticated defense of the adversary 
system excuse.1 7 But the burst of activity in the 1970s and 1980s revived 
legal ethics as a serious theoretical subject after a long hiatus. 
Since the tum of the millennium, philosophical legal ethics has taken a 
new tum, with energetic, sophisticated writers who reject the earlier critiques 
of the standard conception and the focus on role morality in favor of different 
questions and answers. These authors include Tim Dare, Kate Kruse, Daniel 
Markovits, and Nonnan Spaulding. IS Among the most prominent and 
productive of this new wave of ethics theoreticians is W. Bradley Wendel, 
15. See DAVID LUBAN, Introduction, in LEGAL ETHICS AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 10, at 
I, 11-12 (declaring that lawyers cannot avoid moral accountability and, thus, should accept moral 
responsibility for their practice of law). 
16. PLATO, GORGIAS *465c; PLATO, THEAETETUS * 172e-173b. 
17. See Lon L. Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERlCAN LAW 35, 45 (Harold 1. 
Berman ed., 1972) (arguing that an adversarial presentation of a controversy may be "the most 
effective means we have of combating the evils of bureaucracy"); Lon L. Fuller & John D. Randall, 
ProfeSSional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. 1. 1159, 1160-62 (1958) 
(offering an analysis of lawyers' responsibilities within the adversary system, including those of 
advocate and counselor, designer of a framework of collaborative effort, and public servant). For 
further discussion, see David Luban, Rediscovering Fuller's Legal Ethics, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL 
ETHICS 801, 819-28 (1998). 
18. See, e.g., TIM DARE, THE COUNSEL OF ROGUES? A DEFENCE OF THE STANDARD 
CONCEPTION OF THE LAWYER'S ROLE (2009) (providing a contemporary argument in defense of 
the standard conception); DANIEL MARKOVITS, A MODERN LEGAL ETHICS: ADVERSARY 
ADVOCACY IN A DEMOCRATIC AGE 2 (2008) (arguing in part that an alternative approach to legal 
ethics based partly on "distinctively lawyerly virtue" can render lawyers' lives ethically appealing); 
Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. 1. LEGAL ETHICS 103, 
129-44 (2010) (proposing a model for lawyer ethics that looks beyond zealous advocacy to how 
partisanship can most effectively operate when working with "three-dimensional clients"); 
Katherine R. Kruse, Lawyers, Justice, and the Challenge of Moral Pluralism, 90 MINN. L. REv. 
389, 391-93 (2005) [hereinafter Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism] (asserting that situations 
where a lawyer fundamentally morally disagrees with his client should be addressed under a moral 
conflict-of-interest analysis); Katherine R. Kruse, The Jurisprudential Turn in Legal Ethics, 53 
ARIZ. L. REv. 493, 496 (2011) (suggesting that jurisprudential theories in legal ethics serve as an 
"attractive alternative" to moral theories); Norman W. Spaulding, Professional Independence in the 
Office of the Attorney General, 60 STAN. L. REv. 1931, 1938-41 (2008) (criticizing moral-activist 
lawyers for romantic individualism); Norman W. Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity, 
74 U. COLO. L. REv. I, 6-7 (2003) [hereinafter Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional Identity] 
(arguing that the lawyer's role is founded in notions of service to the client, regardless of the client's 
personal, moral, or ideological inclinations, rather than identification with the client); Norman W. 
Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 
1377, 1377-78 (2008) (arguing that certain situations where lawyers violate human dignity and 
morality stem not from an adherence to traditional notions of professional responsibility within the 
adversary system, but rather from deviations from such notions). 
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whose many distinguished articles have culminated in the much-anticipated 
book that is the subject of this Colloquy. 1 9 
II. Pluralism and Political Morality 
Writers in the new wave differ significantly from each other, but it 
seems to me that their writing shares two main themes, both of which figure 
prominently in Wendel's work. First is an abiding concern with moral 
pluralism-the fact that reasonable people can disagree in their moral views 
even about fundamental matters.20 Moral pluralism is not simply a 
regrettable by-product of human difference and contentiousness. For 
Wendel, value is itself plural.21 
Given the central fact of value pluralism, the new-wave writers are 
troubled at proposals for lawyers to, in effect, impose their own moral views 
on their clients by withholding services on moral grounds.22 Viewed in this 
light, moral activism looks more like moral imperialism, and the lawyer who 
refuses to advance a client's ends on moral grounds is guilty of, at the very 
least, self-righteousness. But that is not all. "Legality," Wendel reminds us, 
"is important because it enables people to live together in a relatively 
peaceful stable society, despite deep and persistent disagreement about moral 
ideals, values, and conceptions of the good life.,,23 So a lawyer who, on 
grounds of conscience, refuses to press a client's legal entitlements is 
sabotaging the very mechanism that allows us to manage value conflicts 
without falling into a war of all against all. The moral activist is not merely 
self-righteous. She is reckless and irresponsible toward a political settlement 
that we all need. 
This takes us to the second theme that Wendel and the other new-wave 
writers press. They criticize moral philosophers for neglecting the political 
dimension of law practice-the fact that a legal system is a political institu­
tion that serves indispensable political ends.24 Here, the argument is that 
framing legal ethics as a purely moral issue (the problem of role morality) 
fundamentally misunderstands the subject. The lawyer's obligations are 
political obligations, not moral ones, and the philosophical disciplines for 
addressing them are political philosophy and jurisprudence, not moral 
philosophy. As Wendel puts it, "legal ethics is part of a freestanding political 
19. w. BRADLEY WENDEL, LAWYERS AND FIDELITY TO LAW (2010). 
20. See Kruse, Challenge of Moral Pluralism, supra note 18, at 391 ("Moral pluralism 
recognizes the existence of a diversity of reasonable yet irreconcilable moral viewpoints, none of 
which can be objectively declared to be 'right' or 'wrong' from a standpoint outside of its own 
theoretical framework."). 
21. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 5, 214 n.12 (explaining that ethical values are diverse and not 
capable of being reduced to one "master-value" that sets forth what constitutes an ethical existence). 
22. E.g., Spaulding, Reinterpreting Professional identity, supra note 18, at 51-53. 
23. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 36. 
24. See id. at 91 (emphasizing that laws are a product of "political institutions" and therefore 
are only legitimate if enacted according to "fair procedures"). 
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morality," and he therefore doubts that "the toolkit of moral concepts that 
should be brought to bear on the analysis is the same toolkit used elsewhere 
in moral philosophy.,,25 
For Wendel, the most important concept in the revised toolkit is 
political obligation in the form of fidelity to law.26 Unlike the standard 
conception, Wendel believes that lawyers are morally accountable-but their 
accountability runs to the law, not to individuals?7 Furthermore, unlike the 
standard conception, lawyers' loyalty consists in fidelity to law, not to client 
interests. 28 At the same time, Wendel and the other new-wave writers 
energetically defend lawyers' obligation to pursue the client's legal 
entitlements, even in the face of countervailing moral reasons not to. Wendel 
insists that fidelity to law would rule out a great many games that lawyers 
play to frustrate discovery, coach witnesses, and throw adversaries off 
balance.29 So his view is not lacking in critical bite. But his overall position 
defends a constrained version of the traditional lawyers' self-conception 
against its philosophical critics. 
Wendel's position has an intuitive attractiveness. It seems to occupy the 
Aristotelian mean between two extremes, the standard conception and its 
critique. Wendel and the other new-wave writers draw their argumentative 
resources from two unquestionably important truths: the fact of pluralism and 
the fact that a legal system is a political institution for managing pluralism 
and civilizing conflict. 
The position has other attractions as well. Wendel takes very seriously 
the undertheorized role of lawyers as advisors on the meaning of law, an 
issue that he explores through the case of the lawyers who wrote the torture 
memos. He believes that "the lawyer's central role is to evaluate whether the 
client is legally entitled to pursue some objective"-in effect subordinating 
even the advocate's role to that of interpreters of law. 30 This is a position 
that I find very appealing. (My own work has moved in a similar direction.) 
25. Id. at 23. In this respect, Wendel agrees with Simon, who argues that problems of legal 
ethics are jurisprudential, not moral. WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A THEORY 
OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 15-18 (1998). In other respects, they disagree sharply. 
26. See WENDEL, supra note 19, at 168 ("[T]he lawyer--client relationship should be structured 
by the ideal of fidelity to law-not to clients-that is, by legal and ethical ideals of fiduciary 
obligations. "). 
27. Id. at 12. 
28. Id. at 2. 
29. Id. at 191. Here, Wendel's view is not far from that of Fuller and Randall, who argued that 
a lawyer "plays his role badly, and trespasses against the obligations of professional responsibility, 
when his desire to win leads him to muddy the headwaters of decision." Fuller & Randall, supra 
note 17, at 1161. This was written in 1958, and it is safe to say that the trial bar in the ensuing half 
century has completely ignored this prescription, viewing the good litigator's job precisely as 
muddying the headwaters of decision when doing so benefits the client. The smart money would 
predict that Wendel's ethical prescription that litigators refrain from lawyer games will end up in 
the same boat-which, I can report, is the same boat that critics of the adversary system and the 
ideology of advocacy have always been in. 
30. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 56. 
678 Texas Law Review [Vol. 90:673 
Fidelity to law means not only pursuing legal entitlements, but also 
interpreting the law faithfully, a point to which I return below. In addition, 
like the process theorists of the 1950s, Wendel places special emphasis on 
the craft values of the legal profession as an ethic designed to make the 
process work as it is supposed to work. This will hold obvious appeal to 
conscientious lawyers who believe that high-quality work is usually more 
ethical in every sense than sloppier work. 
Finally, the book is attractive as a piece of argumentation. Wendel is 
philosophically sophisticated, and political philosophy securely anchors his 
argument, but he wears his learning lightly and avoids philosophical 
complexities for their own sake. He knows the law of lawyering, he engages 
with the scholarly literature, and he makes telling use of examples. All in all, 
Lawyers and Fidelity to Law is admirably lucid and carefully done. 
However, I disagree with important aspects of the theory. Ultimately, it 
seems to me, Wendel puts too much faith in existing legal institutions and 
too much faith in procedure at the expense of substantive justice. In places, 
he writes as though the existing legal system is about as good as it can get. 
There is, I fear, complacency here as well as excess willingness to discount 
substantive injustice as little more than collateral damage in a basically just 
system. I discuss these issues in Part III. 
I next examine Wendel's basic metaphor of fidelity to law. The view I 
shall defend is that outside the specific context of legal interpretation, law is 
not the kind of thing that deserves fidelity. In its primary meanings, associ­
ated with marriage, friendship, and religious faith, fidelity pertains to 
personal relationships, not a relationship with an abstract entity like "the 
law" or even an institutional arrangement like "the legal system." 
Furthermore, in its primary meanings, fidelity is a narrow concept, narrower 
than loyalty or professional or personal obligation. Properly understood, the 
moral obligation to respect the law-when it exists-is different from fidel­
ity and is actually an obligation running not to the law but to fellow members 
of the community the law governs. It is, moreover, an obligation based on 
reciprocity, so that laws and legal systems marred by structural or systematic 
inequalities do not deserve respect to the extent Wendel thinks they do. 
Flawed legal systems exercise a lesser claim on us, one that can be 
overridden by countervailing moral concerns. This is Part IV. 
In the final part, I ask where the morality went. In Wendel's view, the 
legal system provides second-order reasons not to ask first-order moral 
questions, but the questions surely do not go away. Wendel, too, is 
concerned about this difficulty, and he tries to address it. I conclude that his 
strategies either fail or move Wendel to a position that is not so far from 
moral activism after all. 
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III. The Best of All Possible Legal Systems 
679 
In conspicuous ways, Wendel's political philosophy is a return to the 
legal-process theory of the 1950s. Process theorists observed that every 
society needs an "institutional settlement"-a kind of social contract 
establishing the lawmaking and dispute-resolution mechanisms for the 
society.3l Once the institutional settlement is in place, we must comply with 
it: "[D]ecisions which are the duly arrived at result of duly established 
procedures .. . ought to be accepted as binding upon the whole society unless 
and until they are duly changed.,,32 The words are Hart and Sacks's, but they 
capture Wendel's argument as well.33 The three dulys in this sentence 
hammer home the fundamental point that the institutional settlement 
represents society's chosen way of doing things, which threatens to unravel if 
people cut comers or take shortcuts. People must pursue their interests 
within the terms of the settlement, and lawyers are the agents of that pursuit. 
For Wendel, fidelity to law means respect for law, where respect is a 
term of art meaning obedience-plus: not only obeying law, but "conducting 
one's affairs with due regard for the legal entitlements of others. ,,34 The 
question is why the law deserves obedience-plus, given that the law can, after 
all, be pretty awful. 
It appears that Wendel's commitment to obedience arises from an 
important condition he stipulates: "The conception of legal ethics set out here 
is limited to lawyers practicing in a more or less just society.,,35 That is 
because "the normative attractiveness of the lawyer's role depends on the 
normative attractiveness of legality.,,36 The fact that the society is more or 
less just guarantees that acceding to the institutional settlement is not a 
morally outrageous thing to do. 
At this point, I believe, Wendel runs into trouble. He understands 
perfectly well how flawed many features of the American institutional 
settlement are and takes pains to catalogue them: "electoral politics . .. 
skewed by the influence of wealthy donors"; participation limited for many 
by disparities in wealth; structural inequality in education; persistent 
discrimination; and "intrusive policing and bureaucratic indifference. ,,37 
Although he assures us that his "point . .. is not to present an apologia for 
American society,,,38 Wendel sees no problem for the legitimacy of the 
31. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE 
MAKING AND ApPLICATION OF LAW 3-4 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. , 1994). 
32. Id. at 4. 
33. See WENDEL, supra note 19, at 91 ("Laws that are the product of these political institutions 
are legitimate if they are enacted using adequately . . . fair procedures. This is admittedly a thin 
basis for solidarity, but it is likely the best we can do."). 
34. Id. at 88 n.*. 
35. ld. at 96. 
36. ld. at 92. 
37. ld. at 91. 
38. ld. at 92. 
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American system and excuses the procedural evils he has just catalogued as 
"often the byproduct of good-faith disagreements.,,39 In his view, "the 
legitimacy of procedures is not based on optimizing fairness but on doing as 
well as possible,,,40 and he believes that American law "does as well as 
possible at treating the views of all citizens as presumptively entitled to 
respect.,.41 Our flawed institutional settlement is "likely the best we can 
do.,,42 Wendel quotes Churchill's aphorism that democracy is the worst form 
of government except for all others.43 
I am all for not letting the best be the enemy of the good, and I agree 
with Wendel that legal ethics must be a theory for the nonideal world. But 
the concept of possibility at work in assertions that our law "do[ es] as well as 
possible" is slippery.44 Does he mean that no major reforms could make it 
better, or merely that reform is politically impossible given the process flaws 
he himself has catalogued? Wendel has not shown the former or even tried 
to. As for the latter, it is hard to see why a flawed system in which 
entrenched interests can block worthwhile reforms deserves undeviating 
obedience. If it did, then any system with an entrenched, self-reproducing 
power structure-Stalinist Russia, for example-would qualify as "the best 
we can do" and would be "do[ing] as well as possible.'.45 
In places, Wendel lapses into apologetics for the status quo. Thus, at 
one point Wendel considers the objection that partisanship in shaping the 
factual record has nothing to do with value pluralism or the purposes of the 
legal system.46 Why not forbid lawyers from resisting the discovery of 
damaging truths? Wendel's response comes close to an assertion that the 
existing rules are the best they can be: 
The rules of the adversary process, including rules of pleading, 
discovery rules, and rules governing motions practice, represent a 
balance among considerations of efficiency, fairness, respect for the 
privacy interests of litigants, and the desire to resolve disputes 
accurately on the merits. Thus, . . . permitting or requiring litigators to 
take a partisan stance with respect to the facts of a dispute is still 
justified on the grounds that the legal system has established a 
framework for the orderly resolution of disagreement.47 
39. Id. 
40. Id. at 99. 
41. Id. at 114. 
42. Id. at 91. 
43. Id. 
44. See id. at 99 ("[T]he legitimacy of procedures is not based on optimizing fairness but on 
doing as well as possible given the need for both equal respect and finality."). 
45. See id. at 91, 114 ("[A] procedure that does as well as possible at treating the views of all 
citizens as presumptively entitled to respect ... represents the best we can do . . . to embody 
equality in our relations with one another . ... "). 
46. Id. at 57-59. 
47. Id. at 59 (emphasis added). 
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To which one might respond: why suppose that the balance is the right 
one or that the orderly framework is a sufficiently just one? Where does the 
"thus" come from? 
In the same vein, Wendel writes that "[t]he procedures of the legal 
system . . .  constitute a means for living together, treating one another with 
respect, and cooperating toward common ends, despite moral diversity and 
disagreement.,,48 This, however, would have to be shown, not simply 
claimed. What would Wendel's response be to those who find grotesque 
injustice in the American legal system-for example, in our practices of 
mass incarceration and long-term solitary confinement, or in the 
unavailability of civil legal services for the fifth of Americans who today 
qualify for legal aid? Reassuring us that the law "does as well as possible" is 
no answer. 
IV. The Concept of Fidelity 
In this part, I examine the concept of fidelity, the guiding metaphor in 
Wendel's theory. In ordinary language, it combines elements of several 
related concepts, each appropriate in certain contexts but less appropriate in 
others. One context concerns personal relationships: fidelity in marriage, 
friendship, and religion (viewed as a relationship with God or the gods). I 
will call this personal fidelity. Different from personal fidelity is what I will 
call interpretive fidelity: fidelity in interpretation, translation, performance, or 
representation. Wendel pretty clearly works with the concept of interpretive 
fidelity, particularly when the lawyer takes on the role of advisor, charged 
with offering the client an opinion on whether the client can legally do what 
she wants. But Wendel also relies on a concept of obligation to the law that 
he calls fidelity, and I think this is a mistake unless it means obligation to 
persons and not to an impersonal system. Conflating the two senses is also a 
mistake because interpretive and personal fidelity are different. 
A. Personal Fidelity 
1. Marital fidelity.-The most basic ordinary-language use of the term 
fidelity is marital fidelity, and it means, quite simply, not cheating on your 
spouse by having sex with someone else. By extension, this usage has come 
to include fidelity between unmarried intimate partners; but to keep the 
discussion simple, let us focus solely on marriage. 
Importantly, marital fidelity carries no implications of devotion to the 
spouse beyond nonbetrayal, and it refers quite specifically to one species of 
nonbetrayal, namely sexual monogamy. Marital fidelity does not require you 
to be a good husband or wife; it does not demand love or lovingness, or even 
living together: spouses who separate may still opt for fidelity. In ordinary 
48. ld. at 89. 
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language, all fidelity demands is not going to bed with anyone else-in other 
words, fidelity means little more than no infidelity, and infidelity means sex 
outside the relationship, nothing more and nothing less. 
Thus in its most primordial usage, fidelity is a limited concept and a 
severely minimal virtue. It is far narrower than something we might 
superficially take as a synonym, namely loyalty or devotion. An example 
will illustrate the difference. A wife surreptitiously loots the couple's joint 
bank account in preparation for deserting her husband (or the other way 
around). That certainly counts as disloyalty to a high degree, but until the 
moment she has sex with someone else, she has not been unfaithful in the 
primary, ordinary-language sense of the word. Disloyal, yes; unfaithful, no. 
Infidelity is not simply lack of loyalty. It is something stronger. It is 
betrayal in the primordial sense of betraying one person in favor of another. 
This specific sense of marital infidelity gets lost if we redescribe it as 
breaking one's marital vows. That euphemism loses the important implica­
tion that the unfaithful spouse has not merely violated an abstract norm, but 
has gone over to a concrete rival. The sex act between spouse and rival 
signifies transfer of allegiance and not merely loss of allegiance. Marital 
infidelity is a three-party relationship involving two spouses and a rival, not a 
two-party relationship involving spouses alone, and certainly not a relation­
ship between a person and the abstract object called marital vows. 
The nearest political counterpart to infidelity in this sense appears to be 
treason, which according to the u.s. Constitution "shall consist only in 
levying War against [the United States], or in adhering to their Enemies, 
giving them Aid and Comfort.,,49 A citizen can despise the United States, 
steal from the government, or even commit acts of espionage or terrorism 
without being a traitor. Like marital infidelity, treason means something 
graver and more specific than disloyalty. It means switching allegiance to an 
enemy. Someone who merely disobeys the law, or takes the Holmesian bad 
man's "what's-in-it-for-me?" attitude50 toward the law has not betrayed 
anything or anyone, and has not engaged in infidelity to the law. 
2. Friendship.-Other contexts may involve only two parties. To call 
someone a "faithless friend" carries no connotations that she abandons me 
for another friend, only that she cannot be relied upon. The faithful friend is 
one who visits me in the hospital, takes me out to dinner when I'm blue, goes 
the extra mile in helping out when I've lost my job, and does not keep score 
in the game of reciprocation. In this context, fidelity and faith belong side by 
side with a family of terms, mostly etymological cousins-trust, true, truth, 
troth, betrothed-in which trustworthiness and constancy span the whole 
range of behavior, not merely sexual nonbetrayal. When, in a classic legal 
49. u.s. CONST. art. III, § 3. 
50. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897) 
(defining the "bad man" as one "who cares only for the material consequences" of the law). 
2012] Misplaced Fidelity 683 
ethics article, Charles Fried coined the metaphor of "lawyer as friend," he 
was appealing to precisely this conception of lawyerly fidelity to clients.51 
Wendel, on the other hand, rejects a vision of lawyers' ethics founded on 
personal loyalty of lawyer to client, in favor of fidelity to law.52 I take it, 
therefore, that this context of fidelity is not at work in Wendel's version of 
legal ethics-unless, as I believe, fidelity to the law is really a way of being 
faithful to persons. 
3. Religion.-These observations take us to the next primary context of 
fidelity, namely, religion. Etymologically, fidelity comes from fides, the 
Latin word for faith/3 and in religion it means being true to one's faith. Or 
more exactly, it means being true to one's God-and that is an important 
point because it conceives faith in its primary sense as a personal relationship 
between a human person and the divine person. Hewing to one's faith in the 
sense of orthodoxy, ritual, or belief in such abstractions as articles of faith 
represents a distinctively secondary sense; we are more likely to use words 
like devout, pious, observant, or practicing than the word faithful to describe 
this attitude toward religion. 
In the Hebrew Bible, religious fidelity carries powerful overtones of 
sexual fidelity. The chief sin of the Children of Israel, and their chief 
temptation, is idolatry, the worship of other gods. 54 The Second 
Commandment forbids idolatry in powerful terms: "Do not have any other 
gods before me. You shall not make for yourself an idol. . .. [F]or I the 
Lord your God am a jealous God. ,,55 Jealous of what? Of something akin to 
adultery with a rival god. As Moshe Halbertal and A vishai Margalit 
demonstrate, the dominant understanding of idolatry in the Hebrew Bible 
likens it to sexual infidelity, and the prophets convey the warnings of the 
jealous God through powerful sexual imagery. 56 The Children ofIsrael must 
not "lust after their [foreigners'] gods,,;57 if they do, God will punish Israel 
for its "whoredom .. . when, decked out with earrings and jewels, she would 
go after her lovers, forgetting me.,,58 God accuses Israel of playing the harlot 
51. Fried, supra note I,at 1060-61. 
52. See WENDEL, supra note 19, at 168 ("[T]he lawyer--client relationship should be structured 
by the ideal of fidelity to law-not to clients . . . .  "). 
53. MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 465 (II th ed. 2003). 
54. See, e.g., Exodus 32: 1-30 (detailing Israel's worship of the golden calf after the exodus 
from Egypt and God's resulting anger); I Samuel 15:22-23 ("Has the LORD as much delight in 
burnt offerings and sacrifices, as in obeying the voice of the LoRD? . . . For rebellion is as the sin of 
divination, and insubordination is as iniquity and idolatry."); Psalm 97:7 ("Let all those be ashamed 
who serve graven images . . .  ; worship Him, all you gods."). 
55. Exodus 20:3-5, appearing in slightly different words in Deuteronomy 5:7-9. 
56. MOSHE HALBERTAL & AVISHAI MARGALlT, IDOLATRY I, 11-20 (Naomi Goldblum trans., 
Harvard Univ. Press 1992) (1989). I take the biblical passages quoted below from their discussion 
and follow their translation. 
57. Exodus 34:15-16. 
58. Hosea 1:2, 14-15. 
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and "lavishing your favors on every passerby," like "the adulterous wife who 
welcomes strangers instead of her husband.,,59 "On every high hill and under 
every verdant tree, you recline as a whore.,,6o One might almost say that 
religious fidelity is subsumed under marital fidelity. The crucial point about 
religious faith conceived in this way is that it involves a relationship with a 
divine person, not an impersonal divinity like Aristotle's or Spinoza's. 
In each of these contexts, it matters crucially that fidelity appears within 
a direct personal relationship, unmediated by a relationship with an imper­
sonal or abstract entity like marital vows or articles of faith-or, I suggest, 
"the law." 
What, then, might be the personal relationship involved in devotion to 
the legal system? In my own writing, I have argued that respect for the law 
really means respect for the people in one's political community. When the 
law represents a genuine scheme of social cooperation, disobedience is a 
form of free riding, and it expresses disdain for one's fellows. 61 Although 
expressing disdain is not the same as infidelity (because it does not 
necessarily mean betraying one's fellows by allegiance to a rival), it commits 
a moral wrong, and avoiding that wrong is the source of moral obligation. 
That does not mean one must never disobey the law; other moral obligations 
can outweigh the obligation of obedience. Even then, however, the respect 
we owe to our fellows demands that we could (at least in principle) offer a 
reasoned account to our fellows about why our disobedience represents 
something more than free riding.62 
But what if the law does not represent a genuine scheme of social 
cooperation-for example, what if it systematically discriminates against a 
group? In that case, the rationale for obedience to law fails because of a 
fundamental lack of reciprocity. This is what Martin Luther King Jr. called 
"difference made legal,,,63 and like King, I believe that when difference is 
made legal, the victims of discrimination have no obligation to obey because 
their fellow citizens have snapped the bonds of reciprocity. 
59. Ezekiel 16: 15-26,28-34. 
60. Jeremiah 2:18-20. 
61. For a more detailed account of this argument, see LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra 
note 2, at 32-43. What I summarize here is a version of a fair-play argument. It views the law as a 
cooperative scheme that creates obligations when five conditions are met: (1) the scheme creates 
benefits; (2) the benefits are general, accruing to the entire community; (3) the scheme needs 
widespread participation to succeed; (4) it actually elicits widespread participation; and (5) the 
scheme is a reasonable or important one. Jd. at 38; David Luban, Conscientious Lawyers for 
Conscientious Lawbreakers, 52 U. PITT. L. REv. 793, 803 (1991) [hereinafter Luban, Conscientious 
Lawyers]. I believe that some of my arguments in the latter paper-in which I criticize Philip 
Soper's argument that we can be obligated by an unfair cooperative scheme because an unfair 
scheme is better than none at all-apply to Wendel's position as well. See Luban, Conscientious 
Lawyers, supra, at 803--07 (laying out the points against Soper's argument). 
62. LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 46-47. 
63. MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., WHY WE CAN'T WAIT 83 (1964). 
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To sum up, solidarity with our fellow citizens can provide moral reasons 
to respect the law, but those reasons (a) can be outweighed and (b) exist only 
when the law itself is sufficiently fair. A crucial point is that disobedience to 
law in the face of a moral emergency is not necessarily disrespectful to one's 
fellows, and it is not like the paradigm form infidelity takes: betraying one 
person by going over to a concrete rival. 
B. Interpretive Fidelity 
Matters are different when we tum to interpretive fidelity. If an artist 
paints a portrait, we sometimes call it a faithful representation of the sitter; 
audio equipment is often described as "high fidelity"; translations can be 
more or less faithful to the original text. In each of these contexts, fidelity 
andfaitJifulness refer to mimetic accuracy. In such contexts,fidelity has to 
do with representation-literally, re-presentation-or interpretation. 
Interpretive fidelity involves being faithful to an original. The original 
need not be a person; indeed, ordinarily it is not a person: the object of 
fidelity is a musical score, a performance tradition, a written text or verbal 
utterance, or the way light and shadow look on the fayade of Rouen 
Cathedral at 7:00 p.m. on a summer evening. Even in the case of a faithful 
portrait of a person, we mean a faithful rendition of what the person looks 
like, not a moral relationship of loyalty to the subject of the portrait. 
That is not to say that interpretive fidelity to an original lacks moral 
significance. An author who turns her novel over to a translator crosses her 
fingers and hopes for a faithful translation; a reader likewise counts on the 
translator to get it right. A trial witness testifying in a foreign language relies 
on the interpreter. These are moral relationships of trust, but they are 
different from relationships of personal fidelity. 
When Wendel discusses the role of legal advisor and the torture memos, 
the form of fidelity to law he invokes is interpretive fidelity, not personal 
fidelity.64 The "torture lawyers" were, in effect, faithless interpreters. Of 
course, their clients very much wanted them to give the answers they did. 
That fact is irrelevant to the ethics rules, which require independent, candid 
advice (faithful translation) and which, in my view, are right to demand it.65 
In the context of legal advice, I believe Wendel is right to demand fidelity to 
64. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 178-84. 
65. I have written extensively on the torture lawyers, and my views are eye-to-eye with 
Wendel's. What Went Wrong: Torture and the Office of Legal Counsel in the Bush Admin.: 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, ll1th Congo 11-14 (2009) (statement of David Luban, Professor of Law, Georgetown 
University Law Center); DAVID LUBAN, The Torture Lawyers of Washington, in LEGAL ETHICS 
AND HUMAN DIGNITY, supra note 10, at 162; David Luban, Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking 
Bomb, in THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA 35 (Karen J. Greenberg ed., 2006); David Luban, 
Tales of Terror: Lessons for Lawyers from the 'War on Terrorism,' in REAFFIRMING LEGAL 
ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND NEW IDEAS 56 (Kieran Tranter et al. eds., 20 I 0). 
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law-but here it means interpretive fidelity, not the obligation to obey the 
law that is Wendel's central topic in other chapters. 
Clearly, interpretive fidelity is not a sufficient condition of obedience or 
respect for the law-you can interpret the law faithfully and still choose to 
violate it-but what about the other way around? After all, if a lawyer 
interprets the law unfaithfully in advising a client, the client following the 
lawyer's interpretation will disobey the law as it actually is written. If so, 
interpretive fidelity appears to be a necessary condition of respect for law. I 
believe, however, that the relationship between interpretive fidelity and 
respect for law is more complicated than one-way logical entailment. For 
one thing, even if a law deserves disobedience rather than respect or 
obedience, one might still object to disobeying it through unfaithful 
interpretation. It is one thing to announce, "This law is immoral and I won't 
obey it"-the forthright stance of conscientious disobedience-but quite 
another to protest, "I am not disobeying the law" because under a clever bad­
faith interpretation the law permits my action. The latter is the weasel's way 
out. Interpretive fidelity is therefore a self-standing virtue, not merely an 
entailment of obedience. 
V. The Remainder of Morality 
A. Second-Order Reasons 
Wendel's argument for displacing common morality with professional 
morality draws on Joseph Raz's theory of practical reasoning. The basic idea 
is that reasons exist at multiple levels: we of course have "first-order" 
reasons for or against beliefs and actions, but we also have "second-order" 
reasons, meaning "reasons not to act on reasons. ,,66 Raz focuses on a class of 
second-order reasons called "exclusionary" because they are absolute 
preemptions from engaging in first-order moral reasoning. For Raz, 
exclusionary reasons are central to understanding the concept of authority 
(and in particular the authority of law), and it is part of the very meaning of 
authority that it creates exclusionary reasons not to take your own first-order 
moral reasoning into account on a matter that the authority has settled.67 
The problem, of course, is that it begs the question to assert that law has 
authority in Raz's sense, just as it begs the question to assert that legal 
reasons are exclusionary. The analysis of concepts alone will never break us 
out of the closed circle of concepts. One would have to show independently 
that legal reasons are exclusionary. After all, urgent moral reasons one might 
have for breaking the law will equally be grounds for denying the 
exclusionary character of legal reasons. 
66. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 2 l .  
67. JOSEPH RAz ,  Authority, Law and Morality, in ETHICS I N  THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: ESSAYS IN 
THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 194,214-15 (1994). 
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Perhaps with these concerns in mind, Wendel breaks from Raz in two 
respects. First, he weakens the claim that legal reasons are exclusionary. On 
his view, "law creates presumptive, not conclusive obligations.,,68 Whatever 
second-order reasons law creates, they are not absolutes, and presumably, a 
suitably weighty moral consideration can override them. 
This position is far more plausible and attractive than the absolutist 
view that law always and everywhere preempts morality, but the 
attractiveness comes at some cost. Wendel's seemingly minor modification 
actually undermines the Razian architecture of multiple levels of reasons. 
How can a person know whether the tough choice she now faces falls under 
the exclusionary presumption or counts as one of the exceptional cases when 
she should engage in first-order moral deliberation? The only way she can 
decide is by engaging in first-order moral deliberation. In that case, the two 
levels collapse into one, and in place of Raz and Wendel's split-level 
structure, the agent must simply engage in first-order balancing of the moral 
obligation to respect law against the countervailing obligation to break the 
rule, with a presumption on behalf of sticking to the legally defined role. 
This view turns out to be nearly identical to my own version of moral 
activism.69 It may be that the only difference between Wendel's conception 
of legal ethics and mine is that he assigns greater (but not absolute) weight to 
upholding the legal system because he finds it more fair and just than I do; he 
himself suggests this at one point. 70 
The second way that Wendel differs from Raz is that rather than 
deriving his theory of (semi)exclusionary reasons from conceptual analysis, 
he offers a normative argument for it.71 The normative argument consists of 
the political defense of legal procedure and institutions based on value­
pluralism, which we have already examined. It rests on a premise that 
Wendel does not articulate in so many words but that seems like the 
necessary source of his anxiety about the bad consequences of lawyers acting 
as moral free agents. The premise is that the legal system is comparatively 
fragile. Its system of roles cannot fulfill the purposes of legality if "officials 
and quasi-officials"n break from their roles to work equity in the face of 
68. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 107; see also id. at 21 n.*, 113. Wendel is occasionally less 
careful and backslides to Raz's view-for example, when he asserts that "roles do real normative 
work by excluding consideration of reasons that someone outside the role would have to take into 
account," and when he writes that "the lawyer's professional obligations exclude resorting to 
ordinary moral considerations in deciding how to act." Id. at 171 (emphasis added). 
69. I develop this "deontological" version of moral activism-in which the role creates a 
presumption that may be overcome-in David Luban, Freedom and Constraint in Legal Ethics: 
Some Mid-course Corrections to Lawyers and Justice, 49 MD. L. REv. 424, 425-35,443-52 (\990). 
70. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 241-42 n.67 ("To the extent [Professor Luban] believes that a 
legally established framework is fair and reasonable, our positions may not diverge substantially."). 
71. Id. at 113-14. 
72. Id. at 171. For Wendel, a lawyer is a quasi-official. Id. 
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what Wendel calls "localized injustice.,,73 The system will be undermined 
unless its functionaries work to rule. 
This premise is an empirical hunch. Fair enough, but my own hunch is 
quite the opposite. In labor-management settings from factories to police 
forces, "work to rule" is a form of job action, a kind of strike without actually 
going on strike. That is because in the real world we expect people to make 
the innumerable minor adjustments that rules cannot capture, and if they 
refuse to exercise discretion, the enterprise will grind to a halt. The system 
of rules works best when it sets broad guidelines with the expectation that 
people will deviate from them when common sense demands it. That is the 
way the world works, and good systems of rules count on it. 
I believe the same is true with moral common sense: we need people to 
act on it. There are countless forms of antisocial behavior that the law does 
not prohibit, and individual conscience by itself cannot be counted on to 
control. Instead, we rely on informal social mechanisms of approval and 
disapproval, smiles and frowns, sharing and shunning to make the system 
work. Among those mechanisms is withdrawal or tempering of assistance.74 
As between a system followed unswervingly by role players and a system of 
recourse roles in which the functionaries are willing to deviate when moral 
common sense requires it, I think the latter actually works far better than the 
former. The legal system works best, I conjecture, if people keep their 
conscience switched on, just as they keep their common sense switched on. 
These observations about the role of morality and the structure of moral 
reasoning are somewhat abstract, and it will help to look at an example to 
which Wendel devotes considerable attention: the much-discussed Spaulding 
v. Zimmerman.75 Spaulding concerns a lawsuit by a youth badly injured in 
an auto accident. The defense did their own X-rays and their doctor discov­
ered a potentially fatal aortic aneurism that Spaulding's own doctor had not 
found.76 Rather than increase their client's financial exposure by warning 
Spaulding that he could drop dead at any minute, the defense lawyers kept 
silent and settled the case cheaply77-as the duty of confidentiality under the 
standard conception requires. This strikes most people as morally 
outrageous. Spaulding poses an awkward problem for Wendel, who thinks 
that in legal ethics the moral question is the wrong question. In Wendel's 
view, "it is a hard case, which is why it has become a classic in legal 
ethics. ,,78 
73. Id. at 103. 
74. See LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE, supra note 2, at 116-69. 
75. 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962). For extensive discussion, including interviews with 
participants, see Roger C. Cramton & Lori P. Knowles, Professional Secrecy and Its Exceptions: 
Spaulding v. Zimmerman Revisited, 83 MINN. L. REv. 63 (1998). 
76. Spaulding, 116 N.W.2d at 708. 
77. Id. 
78. WENDEL, supra note 19, at 74. 
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On the contrary: Spaulding is not a classic because it is a hard case but 
because it is an easy one. We know the right thing to do. Wendel himself 
finds "non-disclosure intolerable for moral reasons" and adds that 
Zimmerman's lawyers should "disclose anyway and run the risk of 
professional discipline.,,79 Exactly. What makes the case unnerving is that 
everyone knows the right answer, but until fairly recently, the law of 
lawyering made it impossible to get there. 80 Although Spaulding is not a 
hard case, it is a hard case for Wendel's theory. 
B. Moral Remainders 
Wendel is sensitive to the concern that his ethics of fidelity to law 
excludes morality too much. As we have seen, one way he deals with the 
concern is by weakening the exclusionary force of law so that it can be 
overcome by sufficiently strong moral reasons. Another is through the 
notion of a moral remainder, a concept that Wendel borrows from the philos­
opher Bernard Williams.8 l When we make moral choices in which every 
option involves some moral wrong--call these "tragic choices"-then even 
the right choice will leave claims of morality unfulfilled, and these "moral 
remainders" do not go away-they are not simply cancelled in a moral cost­
benefit analysis that leaves a net profit. 82 Wendel argues that the claims of 
ordinary morality that get subordinated by the lawyer's role morality can be 
regarded as moral remainders.83 
The question is what work moral remainders do. Are they there simply 
so that "the actor feels lousy about having made the decision,,?84 Wendel 
doubts that this is enough, although he hopes that painfully experiencing the 
moral remainder might lead political actors to better decisions.85 But what 
more is there? Wendel speculates that "moral remainders give rise to a 
retrospective obligation to make atonement in some way, perhaps by working 
against injustice in the system in areas that do not [a]ffect the representation 
of one's clients.,,86 
The demand for atonement seems to take moral remainders seriously, 
but the form of atonement Wendel proposes makes matters too easy. The 
79. [d at 75. 
80. Wendel believes that the rules at the time of Spaulding (the 1908 Canons of Professional 
Ethics) may have permitted disclosure. [d at 170 n. * (citing Cramton & Knowles, supra note 75, at 
80). That would be so, however, only if we accept the court's argument that because SpaUlding was 
a minor, failure to disclose at settlement is a fraud on the court. My own belief is that this argument 
was a reach on the part of the court in order to get the right result. 
81. [d at 12, 172-73. 
82. See id at 167-72 (noting that sometimes lawyers may act with "dirty hands," which may 
result in a "moral remainder attach[ing] to the lawyer's decision"). 
83. [d at 172. 
84. [d 
85. [d at 173. 
86. [d at 12 (footnote omitted). 
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proposal fits nicely with the bar's anodyne ideology of public service. On 
this view, pro bono on some matters atones for anti-bono on others. The 
problem is explaining why atonement can take so indirect a form. Genuine 
atonement, it might be thought, requires rectification to the victim.87 Why 
not, then, tell a lawyer faced with a moral remainder to apologize to the 
victims and make financial restitution to them? That Wendel does not even 
consider the direct form of atonement suggests that he does not really believe 
that moral remainders require atonement. In that case, it seems to me that the 
concept of a moral remainder does no real work. 
VI. Conclusion 
Lawyers and Fidelity to Law is a major book that deserves careful 
study. One feature that my criticisms may have obscured is the essential 
decency of its moral sensibility-a decency that shines through every page. 
The virtue Wendel's position exhibits is liberal tolerance for plural values; 
the virtues he demands from lawyers are fidelity to the rule of law, honesty in 
interpretation, and craft. All of these are admirable. As I have interpreted 
him, however, Wendel's position is decency at odds with itself. He wants to 
exclude everyday morality from legal ethics, but not completely. He recog­
nizes deep problems in our legal institutions, but he wants to say that they 
still demand near absolute obedience. He wants to acknowledge moral 
remainders, but only within the parameters of bar ideology. Of course, 
anyone who writes on legal ethics experiences the same sense of 
unresolvable contradiction, whether you call it the problem of role morality 
or, as Wendel does, the political problem of dirty hands. In such a messy 
reality, fidelity to law is a virtue, but it is no substitute for conscience. 
87. Consider the common-sense view of Maimonides: "[T]ransgressions against one's fellow­
men . . .  are never pardoned till the injured party has received the compensation due to him and has 
also been appeased,"  which requires asking his forgiveness, perhaps multiple times. MAIMONIDES, 
MISHNEH TORAH, LAWS OF REPENTANCE, ch. 2.9, 83a-b. Wisely, Maimonides also imposes a duty 
on the injured party to forgive, and if he will not even after three attempts, "the one who refused to 
forgive is now the sinner." ld. 
